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Edith Stein's Thomism 
Mette Lebech 
ABSTRACT: 
After her baptism at the age of 32, Stein engaged with Aquinas on several levels. Initially she 
compared his thought with that of Husser!, then proceeded to translate several of his works, 
and attempted to explore some of his fundamental concepts (potency and act) 
phenomenologically. She arrived finally in Finite and Eternal Being at a philosophical position 
inspired by his synthesis of Christian faith and philosophical tradition without abandoning 
her phenomenological starting point and method. Whether one would want to call this 
position Thomist depends on what one understands Thomism to be. 
Introduction 
It is generally known that Stein was a non-believing Jew before her conversion to 
Catholicism New Year's Day 1922.55 She encountered Aquinas as a way into the 
Catholic tradition. Her translation of De veritate, which came out after many years of 
work in 1931 and 32,56 afforded her the time to habituate herself to his thought world 
-and with it to the Catholic worldview. She 'became so absorbed by his thought that 
an inner clash between it and the phenomenological way of philosophising was 
inevitable.'57 Her own first formation was as a phenomenologist, first studying with 
and later being the assistant of Husser! in Gottingen and Freiburg. During this time 
both Adolph Reinach and Max Scheler had a profound influence on her and each in 
their own way prepared her for the encounter with the thought of Thomas Aquinas. 
Scheler and Reinach's version of phenomenology was, like that of Husserl's 
Ideas, marked by the exploration of the intuition of essences. They shared the 
understanding that an important task for the discipline of phenomenology is to 
enable such intuition,58 which is not exhausted in the achievement of definitions, but 
rather commands a sustained effort at describing, discerning and clarifying, in order 
to look afresh and let the phenomena show themselves forth in their purity. The 
purpose is insight - Wesenschau. When Husserl's transcendental turn led him to 
practically support Heidegger as his successor, Reinach came, for the Bergzabern 
;; This article originates as a paper given to the CentYe Joy Thomistic Studies at St Thomas 
University, Heuston, Texas, 21 March 1913. I am grateful to Kathleen Haney for having 
organised it. It was later given at a Thomas Aquinas Society/Cairde Thomas Naofa 
conference in Dublin, 7 June 2013. 
;
6 Edith Stein: Uber die Wlahrheit 1-2 (Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe = ESGA, vol. 23-24), 
(Freiburg- Basel-Wien: Herder, 2008). 
;
7 A fragmentary foreword to Potency and Act is found in 'German Editor's Introduction' in 
Potency and Act (Collected Works of Edith Stein = CWES vol. XI) trans. W. Redmond 
(Washington D.C.: ICS Publications, 2009), p. xxvi. 
;s See for example Adolph Reinach: 'Concerning Phenomenology', trans. Dallas Willard, The 
Personalist 50 ( 1969), p. 194-221, reprinted in The Phenomenology Reader, ed. Moran and 
Mooney (London and New York: Routledge, 2002) pp. 180-196. 
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S t e i n ,  l i k e  H u s s e r ! ,  u n d e r s t o o d  u l t i m a t e  i n t u i t a b i l i t y  t o  b e  ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ' ,  
a n d  d i d  n o t  s e e  t h a t  a s  c o n f l i c t i n g  w i t h  R e i n a c h ' s  d e s i g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e a l m  a s  ' a  p r i o r i ' ,  
a  t e r m  s h e  a l s o  s o m e t i m e s  h e r s e l f  u s e d .
6 0  
H e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  I  a s  
a  p o l e  o f  e x p e r i e n c e ,  i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l y  l i n k e d  w i t h  e x p e r i e n c e ,  i s  o n e  s h e  s h a r e d  w i t h  
a l l  t h e  p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s .  I n  s o  f a r  a s  s h e  a n a l y s e d  e x p e r i e n c e  f r o m  t h i s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  
s h e  m u s t  b e  c a l l e d  a  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t .  W e  c o u l d ,  h o w e v e r ,  j u s t  a s  
e a s i l y  c a l l  h e r  a  r e a l i s t  p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t ,  i f  w e  b y  t h a t  m e a n  t h a t  s h e ,  l i k e  o t h e r  e a r l y  
p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s ,  i n s i s t s  o n  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  e i d e t i c  a n a l y s i s  f o r  c o m p l e t i n g  t h e  
p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l  p r o j e c t .  S h e  u n d e r s t o o d  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  t o  b e  u l t i m a t e  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  u s  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t o  e x p e r i e n t i a l l y  r e v e a l  t h e  b e i n g  o f  t h e  e s s e n c e s  
( r e f l e c t i n g  w h a t  s h e ,  f o l l o w i n g  H e r i n g ,  c a l l s  ' e s s e n t i a l i t i e s '
6 1
) .  
A  g u i d i n g  q u e s t i o n  i n  S t e i n ' s  a p p r o a c h  t o  T h o m a s  w a s  i n  f a c t  t h a t  o f  t h e  
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  d i m e n s i o n  o f  k n o w l e d g e  ( E r k e n n t n i s ) .  S h e  h a d  b e c o m e  h a b i t u a t e d  t o  
t h e  C a r t e s i a n  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  a n d  w a s  v e r y  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  t h e  K a n t i a n  i n t u i t i o n  o f  t h e  
s y n t h e t i c  a  p r i o r i  a s  s t r u c t u r i n g  f o r  k n o w l e d g e .  S h e  h a d  f o u n d  i n  H u s s e r !  a  
m e t h o d i c a l  a p p r o a c h  t o  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e s e  m o d e r n  i n s i g h t s ,  a n c h o r i n g  t h e m  i n  
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  e x p e r i e n c e .  S h e  f o u n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e n o u n c e  a n  e i d e t i c  a n a l y s i s  o f  
k n o w l e d g e .
6 2  
H e r  r e a d i n g  o f  A q u i n a s  w a s  t o  f i n d  a n o t h e r  w a y  o f  a p p r o a c h i n g  t h e  
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  d i m e n s i o n  o f  k n o w l e d g e ,  r o o t e d  i n  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  a f f i r m i n g  b e i n g  a s  
a n  i n t r i n s i c  p a r t  o f  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  e n d e a v o u r  i n h e r i t e d  f r o m  A r i s t o t l e  a n d  i s s u i n g  i n  a  
f u l l  s k e t c h  o f  t h e  d i m e n s i o n s  o f  a  S e i n s l e h r e .  
6 3  
W e  s h a l l  f o l l o w  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  d i m e n s i o n  o f  k n o w l e d g e  
f r o m  i t s  f i r s t  f o r m u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  d i a l o g u e  S t e i n  w r o t e  f o r  t h e  F e s t s c h r i f t  m a r k i n g  
H u s s e r l ' s  s e v e n t i e t h  b i r t h d a y  ( 1 ) ,  t h r o u g h  h e r  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  F i r s t  Q u e s t i o n  o f  D e  
v e r - i t a t e  ( 2 )  a n d  h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  P o t e n c y  a n d  A c t  ( 3 )  t o  F i n i t e  a n d  E t e r n a l  B e i n g ' s  
t r a n s f o r m a t i v e  a d m i t t a n c e  o f  t r u t h  a s  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  q u a l i t y  o f  b e i n g  w h i c h  
r e v e a l s  t h e  T r i n i t a r i a n  a n a l o g y  o f  b e i n g ,  a r t i c u l a t e d  i n  n a t u r a l  b e i n g ,  f i n i t e  s p i r i t  a n d  
i n f i n i t e  s p i r i t  (  4 ) .  
A s  S t e i n  p r o g r e s s e d  f r o m  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  t h r o u g h  o n t o l o g y  t o  m e t a p h y s i c s  
s h e  h a d  a  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  f e l l o w  t r a v e l l e r ,  w h o  b e c a m e  h e r  G o d m o t h e r  w h e n  s h e  w a s  
b a p t i s e d  i n  1 9 2 2 :  H e d w i g  C o n r a d - M a r t i u s .  C o n r a d - M a n i u s  w a s  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  a  
C a t h o l i c ,  b u t  a  p r o t e s t a n t  C h r i s t i a n ,  n o r  w a s  s h e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  T h o m a s  
A q u i n a s ,  b u t  s h e  w a s ,  f r o m  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  h e r  c a r e e r  a s  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  G i : i t t i n g e n  
5 9  
T h e  e x c e l l e n t  w o r k  o f  J e a n  H e r i n g ,  ' B e m e r k u n g e n  t i b e r  d a s  W e s e n ,  d i e  W e s e n h e i t  u n d  d i e  
I d e e ' ,  ] a h r b u c h  f u r  P h i l o s o p h i e  u n d  p h a n o m e n o l o g i s c h e  F o r s c b u n g  1 9 2 1 ,  p p .  4 9 5 - 5 4 3  c l a r i f i e s  
h o w  t h e  t e r m s  w e r e  u s e d  a m o n g  t h e  ( e a r l y )  p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s ,  a n d  d o e s  s o  b y  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  m e t h o d  o f  e i d e t i c  a n a l y s i s  i t s e l f .  F o r  a  s u p e r b  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  B e r g z a b e r n  
P h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s  a n d  t h e i r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  H e i d e g g e r ' s  i n f l u e n c e ,  s e e  J o a c h i m  F e l d e s :  ' A  
y e t  h i d d e n  s t o r y :  E d i t h  S t e i n  a n d  t h e  B e r g z a b e r n  C i r c l e '  i n  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  
I A S P E S  c o n f e r e n c e ,  e d .  H a y d n  G u r m i n  a n d  M e t t e  L e b e c h ,  T r a u g o t t  B a u t z ,  f o r t h c o m i n g .  
6 0  
E S G A  6 ,  p .  9 ,  f o r  h e r  ( v e r y  i n f r e q u e n t )  u s e  o f  t h e  w o r d  ' t r a n s z e n d e n t a l ' ,  E S G A  5 ,  p .  1 1 4  
a n d  E S G A  6  p .  2 0 0 ,  f o r  h e r  u s e  o f  ' a  p r i o r i ' .  
6 1  
\ ¥ / e s e n h e i t e n ,  E S G A  1 1 - 1 2 ,  I I I ,  §  2 - 3 .  
6 2  
E S G A  2 3 ,  p .  3  ( ' V o r b e m e r k u n g '  t o  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n - c o m m e n t a r y  o f  D e  v e r i t a t e ) .  
6 3  
E S G A  1 1 - 1 2 ,  p .  5  ( , V o r w o r t '  t o  E n d l i c h e s  u n d  e w i g e s  S e i n ) .  
2 1  
Philosophy Society, profoundly interested in ontology, and in particular in the 
ontology of the real (as distinct from the ideal). Conrad-Martius insured that the 
question of a phenomenology of reality was always present to the minds of the early 
phenomenologists.64 Stein's dialogue with Conrad-Martius was frank, serious and 
challenging. Their friendship accompanied Stein to maturity in a direction growing 
from the same root as herself: phenomenology. 
Conrad-Martius survived the war, and published in 1957 an outstanding work 
called Das Sein/5 (Being), in which she presented the fruits of her mature 
reflections.66 The first part of Das Sein concerns categorical being, the being of states 
of affairs, something which had already interested Reinach in his theory of Negative 
Judgement. The insight common to both Conrad-Martius and Reinach is that the 
affirmation of being forms an integral part of the essence of judgement, such that no 
phenomenological analysis of the act of judging is possible without an inclusion of its 
correlate: being. Thus a phenomenological analysis of being should paradoxically be 
possible, and indeed necessary to complete the phenomenological project of founding 
the sciences. 
Paradoxically Heidegger's way from phenomenology to fundamental ontology 
followed along a similar path. Conrad-Martius, however, was very critical of 
Heidegger's approach, which she, like Stein, understood to illegitimately reduce being 
to the human being (Stein thought it reduced it to the being of the unredeemed 
human being).67 To Conrad-Martius being could not be thus arbitrarily limited to the 
human being because judgement concerns cosmic (natural) being and also infinite or 
eternal being besides that of the human being. Stein's criticism of Heidegger can be 
found in an appendix to Finite and Eternal Being, and proves that this impetus 
towards ontology stemming from within the phenomenological tradition already blew 
like a strong wind in the sails of Stein as she engaged with Thomas Aquinas' thought. 
She was convinced that the subjects with which he was dealing ultimately had to be 
the same as those of her times, and thus she read him not as a historian of philosophy 
would, but as a philosopher does: for the arguments he presents and in order to 
encounter a perspective to challenge her own. 
Erich Przywara SJ, who in the years after her baptism had a mentoring 
function for Stein, was indeed, in contrast with Conrad-Martius, a Catholic. Stein 
takes pains in the foreword to Finite and Eternal Being to carefully explain the 
relationship between his Analogia entis (1932) and her own work, implying she has 
64 Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Aussenwelt, in jahrbuch fur Philosophie und 
Phaenomenologische Forschung, 1916, pp. 345-542 and Rea/ontologie equally in the ]ahrbuch, 
but 1923, pp. 139-333. When one is crediting Heidegger with turning phenomenology 
towards ontology, one should not overlook that the immediate context into which he writes 
already deals extensively with ontology. For a discussion of Conrad-Martius' Heidegger-
critique see Alexandra Pfeiffer: Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Eine Phanomenologische Sicht auf 
Natur und Welt (Wtirzburg: Konigshausen und Neumann, 2005) pp. 43-8. 
65 Mtinchen, Kosel Verlag. 
66 Stein responded to both Metaphysische Gespriiche (1921) and Rea/ontologie (1923) in Potenz 
und Akt and Endliches und Ewiges Sein. 
67 ESGA 11-12, Anhang I: Martin Heideggers Existentialphilosophie, p. 480. Trans!. by Mette 
Lebech as 'Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy', Maynooth Philosophical Papers, 2007, 
Maynooth, pp. 55-98, p. 81. 
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read it in great detail. The most important difference seems to be in their 
understanding of the role of theology for metaphysics, a topic discussed at length in 
the Introduction to Finite and Eternal Being, part 4, entitled 'The meaning and 
possibility of a Christian Philosophy'. 
The most fundamental problem Stein would retain with Aquinas' thought 
through to Finite and Eternal Being was that matter should be the principle of 
individuation."8 This problem is linked to our general problem of the transcendental 
structure of knowledge in that the Aristotelian view reserves a transcendental place 
for the non-intelligible (matter), something Stein would explain to be unnecessary for 
the redeemed world-view, in which everything is potentially intelligible in the Word.69 
Apart from such a structural commitment to an idea of pure matter as being in 
principle non-intelligible70 there seems to be no teaching of Thomas she did not 
assimilate, but it must be stressed that that is exactly what she did: assimilate Aquinas' 
thought. Her world view was very much her own, and still very much that of a 
phenomenologist into her mature years. One would not be able to say that she is not 
(also) a Thomist - but whether one would actually want to call her one, would 
depend on what one understands by Thomism.71 One might understand Thomism as 
a doctrine in which Act and Potency, Form and Matter present definitive formative 
concepts, the foundation of which is beyond question. Or one could understand 
Thomism to be a doctrine, which relies on the best available philosophy for 
interpreting the world with the help of Revelation to form a view of the whole that 
allows for science to be a reality. On the first view, as we shall see, Stein is not a 
Tho_mist. On the second she is. 72 
68 Sarah Borden Sharkey: Thine Own Self Individuality in Edith Stein's Later Writings 
(Washington D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010) also affirms this, but 
argues that what Stein puts in its stead, 'individual forms', has no advantages compared to 
Aquinas' solution, and maybe even disadvantages. Stein does think that the individual has an 
essence, and that essences have essential being, but form and essence are not synonyms for 
Stein (nor are they indeed for Aristotle). Some of Borden Sharkey's argument relies on an 
Aristotelian/Thomistic reading of Stein's concept of essence to which the a priori 
(transcendental) nature of essential being remains inaccessible. This is because the 
understanding of the transcendental realm of essences only can be accessed from within 
phenomenologically purified experience, as that which informs and structures it. Stein's focus 
is on the one hand on the individual, as Aristotle's focus was on ousia, because it is that 
without which the world remains unintelligible and on the other on essences of greater or 
lesser generality. This is another way of expressing what Borden Sharkey rightly affirms, that 
Stein's concern is not with individuation, but with individuality (p. 18). It seems to me that 
Borden Sharkey's placing of Stein into the discussion of individual form slightly dislodges 
Stein's project and may well generate the problems she sees in her account, in particular as 
regards the possible devaluation of what is common to human kind. 
69 ESGA 11-12, IV, §4, 5. 
70 One could say she reserves a place for understanding matter as unintelligible, namely as 
characteristic of the unredeemed world view. 
71 See Borden Sharkey op. cit., pp. xvii-xx: 'Edith Stein and Thomism' for the various points 
of view that have been expressed on the matter. 
72 It would be awkward to call Stein's philosophy 'scholastic', except if what one means by 
that is simply 'academic', i.e. conducted in the 'Schools', i.e. in or around the institutional 
setting of the University. But this would include most contemporary philosophy, which 
1. The Festschrift Article 
On the occasion of Husserl's seventieth birthday, a Festschrift was prepared for him 
by his students and associates. The first version of the article Stein contributed 
presents Aquinas in a dialogue with Husserl on the eve of the latter's birthday.73 It 
was later rewritten at the instigation of the editor of the Festschrift, Martin Heidegger, 
to omit the dialogue form, but retain all the points. As Stein in the first version 
portrays the characters of her interlocutors as well as their philosophical divergences, 
this version is enriched by the wealth of information one gathers from an attitude 
displayed by a character.74 Stein's familiarity with her characters is obtained from her 
engagement with the work of both authors, and in the case of Husserl, also through 
personal acquaintance. The characters present her understanding of their ideal selves 
engaging in a dialogue the basis of which lies outside time. Stein's Aquinas 
(SAquinas) has a clear grasp of what distinguishes his position from Husserl's, and 
moreover has the benefit of hindsight of more than 700 years. This allows him to 
explain his position to Husserl, and also at times to explain Husserl's position to 
Husserl. Since the article is addressed to Husserl as a gift, it is mostly Aquinas that 
Stein lets speak, possibly to avoid phrases Husserl would find alienating. The 
interpretation of his thought by his student Stein is thus put in the mouth of 
SAquinas, but whether a Thomist would find this Aquinas an accurate intellectual 
portrayal might be a subject of contention. Stein's Husser! (SHusserl), in contrast, 
sometimes will not discuss a point or looses himself in thought to the point where an 
answer is not forthcoming. Such foibles must have been clear enough to all and also 
to Husserl, for him not to be offended by their humoristic portrayal. Alternatively, 
Stein is making a point (which Heidegger as an editor might have wanted to 
mitigate). The impression is of two characters genuinely attempting to understand 
each other's view point in a highly complex but serene debate. 
would jar with the implicit understanding that 'scholastic' refers to a type of philosophy 
conducted within a specific time period past (however one defines this period), which 
accepted faith as a source of knowledge. Stein does accept faith as a source of knowledge, but 
that seems nevertheless insufficient to characterise the thought as 'scholastic', except if one 
believes that the tradition of scholastic philosophy is not restricted to the past. See Borden 
Sharkey op. cit. p. 56-72: 'The Scholastic and Phenomenological Traditions'. 
73 The title of the published article was 'Husser! and Aquinas, a Comparison', 1929. The first 
version of the article, 'Was ist Philosophie? Ein Gesprach zwischen Edmund Husser! und 
Thomas von Aquino', was published first in Edith Stein: Erkenntnis und Glaube, Edith Steins 
Werke = ESW (the first Herder edition of Stein's works), Bd. XV (Freiburg- Basel- Wien: 
Herder, 1993). It will appear shortly in ESGA 9, as the last of the ESGA volumes. The two 
vers,ions were translated into English and helpfully presented alongside each other for 
co parison by Walther Redmond, in Edith Stein: Knowledge and Faith, CWES 8 
(W shington D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000) pp. 1-63. 
74 rich Przywara also appreciated the 'artistic value' of this piece. 'Edith Stein. Zu ihrem 
zeh ten Todestag' in In und Gegen (Nurnberg: Glock und Lutz, 1955), quoted in Andreas 
Speer und Francesco Tommasi: 'Einleitung' in Thomas von Aquin, Uber die Wahrheit 1 
(E GA 23), p. XXI. 
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The dialogue starts out by Aquinas affirming his accord with Husser! in philosophy 
having to be done 'as a rigorous science', as a 'serious, sober inquiry of reason'.75 Then 
five important points of divergence are identified and the position of both thinkers on 
these points is discussed. The points are (1) the role of faith in philosophy, (2) the 
need for a starting point for philosophical inquiry, (3) the relationship between the I 
and the absolute I, (4) empirical and/or eidetic methods and (5) the nature of 
intuition. 
(1) For SAquinas faith is necessary for the completion of the work of reason, 
such that philosophy as a rigorous science cannot be completed without it. SHusserl, 
in contrast, objects that a distinction between natural and supernatural reason would 
jar with the transcendentality of philosophy, where such distinctions have no place. 
SAquinas, however, finding ways to understand and take SHusserl's perspective, 
reproaches SHusserl for not seeing the (essential) limits of human reasoning, which 
deems our philosophy to be fragmentary, and intimates that this fragmentation can be 
overcome only with the help of faith. SHusserl retorts he never intended to contest 
the right of faith for religion, but denies it can have a decisive role for philosophy. 
Thus the distinction between natural and supernatural reason is accepted by him and 
SAquinas is able to follow up by introducing a corresponding distinction between 
natural and supernatural philosophy: metaphysics relying on both. About 
metaphysics relying on both, he comments in a parenthesis: 
(The loss of the appreciation for this fact accounts for the abstruse character of all 
modern philosophy and at the same time, quite consistently, for the mistrust of 
metaphysics felt by so many modern thinkers/6 
It remains that the certitude of faith remains a question of faith, and thus that 
modern philosophy is justified in its mistrust if it does not want to rely on it. 
SAquinas clearly has an understanding for this, but he is equally insistent that 
metaphysics cannot achieve its goal without faith. 
(2) Thus the question of whether there is a need for a starting-point in 
philosophy presents itself. To SAquinas it is clear that modern philosophers, who 
exclude faith and make do with natural knowledge must first search for a starting-
point for their inquiry. He presents Husserl's quest for a realm of genuine immanence 
within the transcendentally purified consciousness as prolonging this quest for a 
knowledge that is absolutely certain, absolutely one with its object. But he does not 
think this quest can succeed without faith in God, who is this knowledge identical 
with is object. The quest is not fruitless, however. It led to a 'methodological purity, 
perhaps unknown before'.77 As he contemplates it, SAquinas admits his dependence 
75 Knowledge and Faith op. cit. p. 8. 
76 This is SAquinas' explanatory comment. Knowledge and Faith op. cit. p. 19. He continues a 
bit later: 'I should add, by the way, that you will find scarcely anything of what I have just 
been saying about the relation of faith and reason in my writings. For me it was all a self-
evident starting-point. I am speaking now from a later reflection on how I actually proceed, 
as it is needed today for a rapprochement with moderns' p. 20. 
77 Ibid., p. 24. 
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on the methods of his time and confesses his ultimate intentions of serving truth and 
peoples' peace of mind. His is a 'philosophy for life'. 78 
(3) It is thus on the issue of first truth, on the relation between the pure (or 
transcendental) I and the absolute I, that their philosophies must part ways. SAquinas 
explains how Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is general ontology, but 'with 
a radical shift of sign' and admits there is room in his own philosophy for 
accommodating constitutional analyses - i.e. analyses of how things are constituted 
for consciousness - but not as fundamental. SHusserl, however, does not wish to 
enter into discussion of the difference between the ego and God, but is far from 
admitting defeat. 79 
( 4) Instead he changes the topic and wishes to ask how SAquinas views the 
distinction between essence and fact, since it is fundamental to ontology as SHusserl 
understands it (material and regional ontologies investigating the essence of the 
various subjects of the sciences, under which the facts sort). SAquinas admits he 'did 
not distinguish them as a matter of methodological principle'.80 What he was after was 
the broadest possible picture of this world and indeed of it as the basis for the best 
action (a motive SAquinas also explicitly ascribes to SHusserl). But he did distinguish 
between essence and accident and considered that which applies to things according 
to their essence as the 'basic scaffolding of the world'. 81 Although the play of free 
possibilities was not his concern, eidetic analyses conducted through such variation 
were granted by SHusserl's students to scholastic enquiries according to SAquinas, 
and it allowed them to access these latter. 
(5) And thus we come to the last discussion concerning intuition or essence-
viewing (Wesenschau), which is the longest of them all. An immediate vision of 
essence seems to be available to Husserl as a priori. About it SAquinas states that 
Wesenschau 'may well have been the greatest stumbling block in your philosophy for 
Kantians and neo-scholastics' alike.82 Such immediacy as regards the knowledge of 
essences obtains only for the blessed in Heaven or indeed for God, according to 
SAquinas. On the other hand, it also obtains for our knowledge of principles. 83 
SAquinas is not keen to admit such immediate (a priori) knowledge to essences in 
statu via, but admits they may be. obtained through reasoning, such as for example 
eidetic variation. But the knowledge of them is mediate in another sense, it is 
mediated through species. 'Knowledge of the species themselves, on the other hand, is 
not knowledge through species. But it is still mediate in the first sense of being 
acquired actively.'84 Thus SAquinas is open for the possibility of phenomenological 
essences being equivalent to the species through which we gain knowledge of things, 
and as knowledge of the species is reflexive, it is immediate in that it is not mediated 
through species. Only the blessed can intuit this fully, as they do so in the Word 
whom they see face to face (and see the world through). For us in statu via, the 
78 Ibid., p. 27-8. 
79 Ibid., p. 32-3. 
80 Ibid., p. 34. 
81 Ibid., p. 36. 
82 Ibid., p. 39. 
83 Ibid., p. 50. 
84 Ibid., p. 56. 
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intuition of essence is never completely fulfilled, although it helps us clarify our 
understanding. It remains that for us the intuition of essence is immediate in two 
senses (only): it is not known through effects, and it is not empty. This is very little in 
comparison to the intuition of essence completely fulfilled. 
It may well be that this last question concerning intuition is what allows for 
the most fruitful interaction between phenomenologists and Thomists. It possibly is 
the fundamental one involving the rest, as it also touches on the relationship between 
the essences and the Ideas, and therefore also on the relationship between the human 
I and God. 
2. The Translation-Commentary of De veritate 
Stein had thus outlined the differences between the two standpoints she set out to 
bridge and integrate.85 She continues this integration in a new key in her translation-
commentary of De veritate, which also bears the title: 'Aquinas' teaching on 
Knowledge according to the Quaestiones de veritate'86 - a systematic title true to her 
intentions to penetrate to the meaning of what Aquinas says by means of her 
'translation'. To this end Thomas' text is restructured, abbreviated and provided with 
succinct and insightful resumes and critical comments, attempting to penetrate - as 
always -to the matters under discussion and not only to what Thomas says. 
This way of proceeding - successful only because of its meticulous precision -
highlights the epochal difference between the presuppositions of classical and modern 
philosophy.87 The thoroughness lets Stein 'discover' things obvious to the careful and 
persistent reader, which easily evaporates when doctrinal consistency takes 
precedence. Aquinas, for instance, taught in fact that God and angels have knowledge 
of the individual, something which reveals that he thought that individuation by 
matter (by the principle of non-intelligibility) did not matter to them.88 Thus 
individuality as such cannot be unintelligible (and he could not reasonably have 
thought it was), since it is not unintelligible to superior intellects. In so far as he 
thought that the true is what being is in relation to knowledge, and that being is the 
85 
'Wenn es nur ein Kern von Wahrheit hier und dort ist, so musses auch eine Briicke geben'. 
ESGA 23, p. 4. The 'Vorbemerkung' is found in Stein's Handexemplar, where she has inserted 
it in her own handwriting, and reconstructed carefully by the editors. 
86 Ibid., p. 3. 
87 A publication of the work as a translation has occurred (Wiesbaden: Marixverlag 2013 
(Kindle)) with a foreword of Bruno Kern. He presents the work in the introduction ('Von 
der Vollkommenheit der GeschOpfe gering denken heiflt die Vollkommenheit der gottlichen 
Macht herabmindern') in the following manner: 'Die Textabschnitte der einzelnen Artikel 
sind so zusammengestellt, class der Grundgedanke und die wesentlichen 
Argumentationsschritte leicht nachvollziebar werden und die Leser und Leserinnen sich nicht 
in einem Labyrinth unterschiedlicher Argumentationsketten verlieren. Mit guten 
Uberleitungen fiigt sie die Texte so aneinander, class der Hauptgedanke klar hervortritt. Jede 
Questio wird mit einer auflerst erhellenden Zusammenfassung der wesentlichen Gedanken 
beschlossen.' This edition might well allow the work to be read in the manner in which it was 
intended, as an introduction to Aquinas' own thought. 
88 ESGA 23, Q. VIII, a. 11. Aquinas: De veritate Q. VIII, a. 11. 
27 
first object of the intellect (i.e. that which it primarily knows), no being can in fact be 
in principle unintelligible.89 This transcendental insight about knowledge and about 
being remains the stepping stone for Stein from phenomenology to Thomist 
ontology, since it constitutes the transcendental core of being, knowledge and truth. 
3. Potency and Act 
Because we know that Finite and Eternal Being resulted from Stein's rewriting of 
Potency and Act for publication, we are tempted to read the latter as an earlier version 
of the former. That is helpful in so far as the latter work is, according to the subtitle, 
'studies toward a philosophy of being' and seeks, like Finite and Eternal Being, to 
ascend to the meaning of being. The two works are, however, profoundly different. 
The concept of matter as a structural feature present in the first work has been 
superseded in the second and no longer serves as an opposite to pure act to account 
for order in the universe, or for the difference between regional (material) and formal 
ontology. 
Potency and Act is an attempt to clarify what potency and act mean, from 
within experience (i.e., phenomenologically), and in accordance with both Aquinas' 
and Husserl's use of the terms. Apart from understanding what those terms mean 
(i.e. conducting an eidetic analysis of them), Stein is exploring their role for Thomas's 
and Husserl's understanding of the whole, of all there is to know, of being. She says 
herself that her work issues from an attempt to understand the 'method' of Aquinas, 
to expose the Organon of his fundamental concepts, something she also struggled 
with in her early comparison/ dialogue.90 She finds it necessary to do so because 
Thomas does not explore his own method, and because she as a philosopher must 
find out whether the reliance on these terms is justified or not. Her own method is 
thus an 'objective' (sachlichen) analysis of Aquinas' fundamental concepts, i.e. an 
investigation of the realities expressed in the concepts, a penetration towards their 
meaning, towards 'the things themselves' in order to assess the validity of the 
concepts.91 As potency and act divide and concern being in its entirety, penetration 
towards their meaning is likewise a way of approaching the whole of being, as indeed 
Aquinas did with the help of this distinction, following a well-established tradition. 
In the work we see being occurring under three forms -the internal world, the 
external world and the beyond of the world - spirit in persons and ideas, nature in 
material things, and the absolute in that towards which both of these point for the 
explanation of their existence. Both of the latter announce themselves in the former 
in virtue of their transcendence, their reality or material fullness (Fulle), and all admit 
of a meaning to potency and act. This meaning, however, cannot be investigated in a 
purely formal manner, as act and potency concerns the content of being. This is why 
Stein's analysis of potency and act must take the form of a presentation of the 
analogy of being, of act and potency as bearing on spirit, nature and their 
presupposition in absolute being. The formal ontology of potency and act cannot be 
89 Dever., Q.l a.l. 
90 Potenz undAkt, ESGA 10, p. 4 (Vorwort), CWES XI p. 1. 
91 Ibid., pp. 4-5. CWES XI pp. 9-11. 
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In Potency and Act Stein works with several of her characteristic ideas: the 
ontological status of ideal or essential being, knowledge of the individual, in particular 
of the human individual, the nature of matter, the core of the person, evolution and 
life. The contrasting of the scholastic and the phenomenological approach already 
yields significant results. On the one hand the phenomenologically experienced unity 
of the I makes Aquinas' understanding of the immateriality of the soul show up as 
being in contrast with the idea that what individuates everything, and thus also the 
soul, should be matter. On the other hand the incontrovertible being of the I, as 
underlined by Husserl, makes it impossible to avoid the ontological investigation (of 
the being of the I) to which Aquinas' contributes. 
4. Finite and Eternal Being 
The novice mistress and subprior at St Maria des Friedens, Sr Teresia Renata, 
somewhat unexpectedly encouraged Stein to finish Potency and Act for publication, 
having a high regard for Stein's abilities and for what she must have seen as Stein's 
special mission. As Stein undertook this work, her external circumstances had 
changed: she no longer was under an economic obligation to teach or to pursue a 
career, time was regularly given over to writing and the quiet disengagement from the 
world left her room to think and study within the safe, but austere, haven of a 
religious community, hidden in a world marked by terror and violence. 
Finite and Eternal Being takes, compared to Potency and Act, a different 
direction already in the first chapter, where Stein reflects on the possibility of (or 
indeed the necessity for) a Christian philosophy to account for the structure of 
reality. Maritain had claimed for moral philosophy the need to be supported by 
Christian principles for the moral philosopher to accede to moral truth, not only 
because grace would strengthen his intellectual powers, but because Christian 
doctrine underpins it (the dignity and equality of all human beings as children of 
God, love as their vocation). Stein claims this support for philosophy as such -not 
only anthropology, but also ontology, as indeed the revelation in the Word of God is 
of a God that wants relation and is relation, in which all relations find their ultimate 
meaning as the meaning of being. The idea that philosophy could achieve its goal 
(perfectum opus rationis) without recourse to Revelation was still- if only implicitly-
affirmed in Potency and Act. Now it is denied: philosophy achieves its purpose 
through theology, but not as theology. 
The consideration of formal ontology is now replaced by a phenomenological 
analysis of essence and essentiality.93 This is due to the fact that form along with 
matter now seems secondary compared to essence to Stein (and with form and matter 
92 ESGA 10, III, §4. 
93 Stein conducts this inquiry in dialogue with Jean Hering, op. cit. 
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the distinction between formal and material ontology94). A close discussion of 
Aristotle has the purpose of determining the relationship between his concept of 
essence (to ti en einai) and the phenomenological one. In the course of this 
investigation the concepts of substance and form are equally discussed to determine 
their relevance for the phenomenological concept of essence, and the ideas of matter, 
mass and material (Stoff) are compared, so as to clarify the Aristotelian concept of 
matter on the one hand and penetrate towards an adequate understanding of 
concreteness, and of the bearer (hypostasis, Trager) of the being and its essence on the 
other. 
Having discussed essence in relation to concreteness, Stein turns in chapter V 
towards being as such, i.e. towards the transcendentals: the being something, one, 
true, good and beautiful of everything. The divisions of being into spirit, nature and 
infinite being has revealed all being, transcendent and immanent, as standing in a 
potential (or real) relationship with spirit (everything stands in a relationship with the 
divine spirit), and hence opened up the possibility of everything being true and good, 
i.e. of everything being known and being appreciated for what it is. Knowledge, in so 
far as it is a relationship to the object, 'helps to build up the what of knowledge and is 
the condition of its reality'. 95 It belongs to all being to be open to be the object of 
such knowledge: that is what is meant by characterising truth as a transcendental. 
'Being is (even if its full meaning is not exhausted by this) being revealed to the 
spirit' .96 
The meaning of being treated in chapter VI relies on this division internal to 
being between nature and spirit, which allows being a meaning, i.e. a 'being for', a 
'being revealed'. This meaning amounts to being as such standing in a definite 
relationship with a certain type of being, namely spirit, and thus it amounts to a 
relationship internal to being, which is itself intelligible, like being, and intelligible 
because it is. 
What is common to the meaning of (all finite) being (where essence and being 
differ) is that it is the: 
unfolding of a meaning; essential being is timeless unfolding beyond the difference 
between potency and act; real being is unfolding out of an essential form, from potency to 
act, in time and space; the being of thought is unfolding in several senses ( . .).97 
94 The distinction between form and content, empty form and fulfilment or 'filling' now 
moves to the forefront to account for the family likenesses of things. Form and content are 
distinct through the type of understanding (Anschauung) we can have of them: The content 
when contemplated allows the spirit to come to rest in the ultimate essentialities, the 
abstracted form refers beyond itself because of its emptiness and hence does not allow the 
spirit to rest in the same way. Endliches und ewiges Sein (ESGA 11-12) V, § 2, p. 242. This, 
however, does not cancel the idea of formal ontology but rather completes it as metaphysics: 
'Alles Seiende ist Fiille in einer Form. Die Formen des Seienden herauszustellen ist die 
Aufgabe der Wissenschaft, die Husser! als 'formale Ontologie' bezeichnet hat.' Ibid., p. 243. 
95 Endliches und ewiges Sein (ESGA 11-12), V,§ 10, p. 254. My translation. 
96 Ibid., p. 258. My translation. 
97 Ibid., VI, § 1, pp. 284-5. My translation; corresponding passage CWES IX p. 331. 
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Apart from unfolding, being also is, in accordance with its transcendental 
characteristics, one, true, good, beautiful and something, something with content 
( erfulltes). 'We mean this complete fullness, when we talk of "being". But a finite 
spirit cannot comprehend this fullness fully. It is the infinite task of insight.' 98 
The contrast between formal and material ontology - between form and 
content as understood by Husserl99 - is replaced by one of ideal and real being, while 
essence moves to the foreground to replace form and matter as basic concepts. The 
idea of being as a hierarchy involving various degrees of actuality - as taken from 
Aquinas -is abandoned, and being is seen as instead reflecting a circular movement of 
mutual implication (that of the Trinity) in spirit, nature and absolute being. The 
meaning of being is approached as the happening and valuing of this reflection as 
experienced. The struggle with the principle of individuation turns into praise of the 
meaning of each individual being, and in particular of the individual human being. The 
thinking through act and potency to finite and eternal being has made the analogy of 
being unfold, with leftovers from both the phenomenological and the scholastic 
tradition falling away. This is an attempt to ascend to the meaning of being, as the 
subtitle indicates, no longer by penetrating to the meaning of act and potency (as in 
Potency and Act), but by penetrating experience to the meaning of being itself. The 
rewriting of Potency and Act made Stein accomplish a shift in presuppositions: as the 
concepts of form and matter were replaced, a new phenomenological ontology 
became possible on a Christian foundation, i.e. in the Logos. The transcendental 
structure of knowledge now takes its place at the heart of ontology, opening up the 
distinction between nature and spirit and leaving room for an infinite spirit whose 
correspondence with being in truth is identical to itself, and has revealed itself in 
Christ. 
Conclusion 
In so far as the idea that matter is the principle of individuation is not essential to 
Thomism, and in so far as form and matter, and act and potency can be investigated 
for their adequacy as concepts to deal with being, whether ideal or real, one can call 
Stein's ontology Thomist or Thomistic. More importantly however, Stein's ontology 
is an attempt to advance Christian philosophy in the tradition of the philosophia 
perennis, to which also Aquinas wanted to contribute. It may be more fruitful to see 
them both as parallel endeavours of the same species, instead of trying to place Stein's 
as a subspecies of the species to which Aquinas' philosophy belongs . 
The fact that she is a Thomist and a phenomenologist (only) in so far as she is 
both, challenges us to cross categories established by major events in the history of 
ideas. This challenge was one she was aware of having a special vocation to meet, but 
also one which she considered to belong to the philosophical discipline as such. To 
her philosophy remained first and foremost systematic, the history of ideas would 
98 Ibid., p. 286: 'We mean this total fullness when we speak of 'being'. But a finite spirit is 
never able to apprehend this fullness in the unity of a fulfilling intuition. It is the infinite task 
of our knowing.' My translation; corresponding passage CWES IX, p. 332. 
99 Logical Investigations V, 2, § 14-15. 
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have to be, and here she is again in agreement with both Aquinas and Husserl, a 
discipline enabling eidetic variation as much as relying on it. 
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